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I. INTRODUCTION
Why do products exit markets?  The short answer is that the products are no longer
profitable.  But what makes products no longer profitable?  The academic literature puts forth a
number of reasons why products that were once profitable are no longer so.  The first stream of
literature argues that as time progresses, an increasing number of firms and products enter the
market, thus pushing down prices.  A firm that was once alone in a market or market niche
encounters many competitors that erode the incumbent’s market power, and depresses price and
profits (Stavins 1995, Carroll 1985).  A second stream of literature argues that a firm’s products
prey on its other products and result in cannibalization.  A multi-product firm must thus optimize
its portfolio to minimize cannibalization.  This means exiting products that do not enhance the
value of the portfolio as a whole (Greenstein and Wade 1998, Schmalensee 1987).  Another vein
of literature examines fixed cost.  If there are significant fixed costs, then scale is important in
order to distribute fixed costs across more units.  Products belonging to small firms will fail in
this environment because their costs cannot become competitive (Stigler 1968).  Yet another
literature argues that it is not fixed costs that doom products, but improvements in marginal
costs.  Firms learn or acquire capabilities that can allow them to consistently improve the cost
structure of their products.  Firms that are unable to dynamically improve their learning or
capabilities over time will find their products uncompetitive (Klepper 1997, Teece et al 1997,
Jovanovic and MacDonald 1994, Jovanovic and Lach 1989, Levinthal 1997).  This literature is a
2superset of a related literature on innovation and the product life cycle.  This work in innovation
argues that firms will invest in process innovation to push down costs.  Firms that do not will
find themselves and their products at a distinct disadvantage (Abernathy and Utterback 1978,
Klepper 1997).  In this sense it is similar to the capabilities literature.  Yet, another aspect to the
product life cycle literature is that firms invest in product innovation in order to enhance the
quality, characteristics, and commercialization potential of products.  If firms do not, their
products will be weeded out by more innovative products (Christensen 1997, Gort and Klepper
1982).
While each of these disparate yet related literatures has demonstrated its relevance and
importance to scholars, there has not been an integrative study that compares these factors and
rigorously examines product exit.  To date, nearly every single study has studied firm exit (e.g.
Hannan and Carroll 1993, Henderson 1995, Christensen et al 1998, Jovanovic 1982, Tushman
and Anderson 1986, Ghemawat and Nalebuff 1985, Schumpeter 1942).  However, the theories
that explain firm exit have their micro-foundations in product markets and strategies.  Hence, to
gain a deeper understanding into the firm survival condition, we must understand what is
happening at the product level, and how choices at the firm level affect product entry, exit, and
profitability outcomes.1  To this end, this study asks what is the most important factor for product
exit—managerial decision-making or the outside environment?  It is also the first study to
examine product evolution from the inception of the industry.
So why do products exit markets? This paper integrates the predictions about product exit
from a number of different literatures and compares the statistical and substantive effect of these
explanations.  We use a novel dataset covering every product introduced into the desktop laser
printer industry since its inception.  Using rigorous statistical methods, this study has three main
3answers to this question.  First, innovation does not drive products out of markets per se.
Managers do not pull products off the market when they innovate.  Rather, they seem keep the
incumbent products on the market and add the newer, more innovative products to the
marketplace with longer expected lives.  Second, competition has a large impact on weeding
products from the market.   These non-innovative products remain in the product portfolios of
companies until competition drives the products out of markets, not managerial decisions.  Third,
holding other factors constant, scale and learning have a marginal statistical and substantive
effect on product exit.  Overall, the results in this paper are consistent with literature on product
proliferation.  However, instead of a strictly horizontal differentiation story (Schmalensee 1987,
Judd 1985), there is product proliferation on the innovative vertical differentiation dimension as
well (Shaked and Sutton 1987).
In the next section we state more concretely the hypotheses of the paper, and simplify and
categorize the literature so that competing theories can be tested.  In the third section of this
paper, we describe the desktop laser printer industry, and explain why it is a good arena in which
to compare theories empirically.  We describe our data, method, and hypothesis
operationalization in Section IV.  In Section V, we offer our empirical results.  In Section VI, we
describe some extensions, and we conclude in Section VII.
II. WHY DO PRODUCTS EXIT MARKETS?
Product exit receives prominent attention in the theoretical literature, yet is often
overlooked in the empirical literature.  One reason is that product population data is extremely
difficult to obtain.  Second, most theories assume single product firms.  Yet, if we are to
understand firm behavior, we must understand what happens to their product portfolios.
                                                                                                                                                            
1 Only two studies to date (Greenstein and Wade 1998, Stavins 1995) examine product exit.
4In this paper, we bring together, simplify, and integrate a number of streams of literatures
to explain why products exit markets.  Are some products so unattractive that managers choose
to discontinue them, or do markets and technology drive them out?
The first reason that products exit markets is because price competition is too fierce, for a
given cost.  A product enters under the expectation of achieving and maintaining a price point.
However, if competitors enter the market space, the market power that the initial product enjoyed
disappears, and the product becomes less profitable.  Thus, we expect to see higher product exit
rates the fiercer is competition.
H1:  Greater competition will result in higher product exit.
A second reason products may exit markets is because of a high cost position.  There are
two types of costs that can be examined are marginal cost and allocated fixed costs.  The strategy
and innovation literature focus on two cost drivers in high technology industries:  economies of
scale and learning.  The fixed cost per unit is lowered by either reducing the overall fixed costs,
or by increasing the number of units over which the fixed cost is allocated.  Some fixed costs can
be allocated across multiple products (such as a factory that makes multiple products), while
other fixed costs can be allocated across each unit of the brand (brand advertising).  Thus, in a
given industry with substantial fixed costs, we expect to see firms with higher market share
obtaining a better cost position, and therefore having lower per unit cost for their products.  This
means that firms with higher market share will have products with lower probability of exit for
cost reasons.
5There is a second effect of learning.  As firms increase production, over time, they learn
how to make products at lower cost.  The learning curve, a widely accepted concept in
management, favors firms who have had high volume output for a long period of time.
H2a:  There will be lower product exit rates for firms with higher market share.
H2b:  There will be lower product exit rates for firms with higher cumulative production over
time.
A third reason products exit markets is because of product portfolio concerns.  That is,
managers maximize the profits of their entire product portfolio, not of individual products.  In a
multi-product firm, a product that does not increase the profitability of the entire portfolio will be
pulled from the market.2  We see this effect most prominently stated in the literature on
cannibalization, where one product can cannibalize sales of another product for a given firm.  If
this is the case, the firm is often better off withdrawing one of the products.  Thus, the higher the
probability of cannibalization, the higher the probability of product exit.
H3:  Product exit rates will be higher the more products a firm has in a given a product niche.
A final cause of product exit is product innovation. There are two main effects we study
here.  First, we would expect that more innovative products survive longer in the marketplace
relative to their less innovative counterparts, controlling for price and other factors.  While this
first effect is straightforward, the second effect of product innovation on the probability of
                                                
2 Note that the individual product, in this case, could be profitable, but it may diminish the profitability of the
product portfolio as a whole.
6product exit is not obvious.  A more innovative product may enter, which may result in an older
product exiting or not.  We consider four cases for the innovative product and incumbent
product: (H4a) hold, exit; (H4b) enter, exit; (H4c) hold, no exit; and (H4d) enter, no exit.  In the
first case, a firm may have a more innovative product, but chooses to wait to enter it.
Meanwhile, the firm exits the current product.  We think this is not interesting (nor an
equilibrium) or extremely unlikely, because it assumes that the firm is better off exiting the
current product and having no products in the market, controlling for competition, cost, price,
and current portfolio.  This case should not happen provided at least one product is profitable,
because the firm would be better off with some kind of profitable product in the market than no
product in the market.  The second case is one where the firm exits the incumbent product, and
replaces it with a more innovative product.  This is because the firm believes that the
replacement product will be more profitable than the incumbent product individually, or both
products together in the market.  The third case is one in which the firm chooses to innovate, but
waits to introduce the new product on the market.  This is because the old product is more
profitable than the new product and more profitable than having both products in the market
together.  The final case is where the firm introduces the innovative product, but does not
withdraw the incumbent product because the profit generated from having both products in the
market exceeds the profits from any individual product in the market alone.
Theories in the literature support each of these different yet mutually exclusive cases.
We leave it as an empirical exercise to identify which actually occurs.  We codify these
hypotheses in Figure 1, and in the hypotheses below.
7H4a-d:  Firms will choose product entry-exit strategies to maximize the value of the portfolio.
(see Figure 1)
H4e:  More innovative products will have lower product exit rates.
III.  THE LASER PRINTER INDUSTRY
We have chosen the desktop laser printer industry in which to examine these hypotheses
for a number of reasons.  First, the characteristics of laser printers are constantly improving,
buffeted by the forces of innovation, and can be easily observed.  Second, the printer industry
has seen numerous product entries and exit since its inception in 1984, and we are able to track
each one with a comprehensive dataset.  Third, the competitive environment varies across the
product space, and therefore we can account for competitive and price effects.  Fourth, there are
heterogeneous firms of different sizes.  Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the laser printer
industry is like a number of other high technology industries, such as personal and mainframe
computers, disk drives, fax machines, retail electronics, and the like.  The products are
differentiated; there is an innovation frontier; there is an important mass market; and product and
firm turnover is prevalent.  Thus the insights from this study we believe will be applicable to
broad sectors of the economy.  We discuss these points further below.
As the personal computer market expanded in 1980s, so too did the market for the
desktop printers.   The first desktop laser printer (available on the retail market) was introduced
by Hewlett Packard in 1984. By the end of 1985, 17 firms had introduced over 23 models of
printers.  Figure 2 illustrates the number of firms and models in the industry from the beginning
of the industry in 1984 to 1996.  At its peak in 1990, the industry had 100 firms.  Since that time,
the number of firms has fallen off to 87.
8Three types of firms populate the industry.  There is a large number of relatively big,
diversified firms such as Ricoh, IBM, Hewlett Packard, Canon, and Xerox.  There is also a small
number of medium sized firms that specialize in multiple printer technologies, such as Lexmark,
Kyocera, Genicom, and Kentek.  Finally, there are over 100 very small “fringe” firms, which
produce few printer models, ship very few units, and tend to appear in the industry only briefly.
Hewlett Packard is the dominant firm in the industry, and has maintained between 45% and 65%
market share for most of the industry’s history. Table 1 documents the concentration ratios of the
top 1, 5, and 10 firms in the industry (noted as the C1, C5, and C10 ratios, respectively).3  If a
firm has appeared in the sample in the C10 ratio, then we call that firm as a dominant firm in that
year.  All other firms are considered fringe firms in that year.  Note that dominant firms account
for between 70% and 87% of the market share in a given year, but account for only 30-45% of
the product models introduced.
At the product level, there has been a large amount of product entry and exit by year.
The number of products on the market has generally been increasing over time, with a peak at
633 product models in 1996.  In Figure 3, we illustrate the amount of product entry and exit by
year, and show that product entry rates peaked in 1990.  Figure 2 and Figure 3 together suggest
that a smaller number of firms are offering more diversified product portfolios.  The average
number of products per firm is 8.8 in 1996, up from 1.8 in 1988.4  We explore this result further
in the econometric analyses.
                                                
3 The quantity data we possess seem to be sufficiently good to make determinations about the largest firms in the
industry.  Unfortunately, the coverage of fringe firms and individual models is poor.
4 In defining the industry, we appealed to the data and to industry experts and trade journals.  These sources
consistently define the desktop laser printer industry as laser printers that print 0-12 PPM, can be attached to a
personal computer, and are small enough to fit on a desk.  This industry definition has remained constant over the
time period.  When we analyzed our data, we excluded printers that were particularly fast, exceeded certain weight
and size measures, or were not designed to communicate with any type of personal computer. Our statistical
analyses are robust to small definitional changes.
9Although printers can be characterized on a number of dimensions, our research has
found that two most common measures of printer performance are speed, measured by pages per
minute (PPM), and resolution, measured by dots per inch (DPI).
We apply the vendors’ definition in determining what constitutes a product.  On the
surface, this definition may seem problematic.  Vendors may have incentives to put many
different product model numbers on the same printer in order to proliferate models in the product
space.  Alternatively, they may make very small changes to a printer and market it as a different
product.  We have examined this possibility and found, with the exception of the addition of
Postscript features (which is a substantial enhancement), printers with different model numbers
generally do have different features.  In addition, unlike some product markets, firms do not
change printer attributes once the product has been introduced.  Rather, they introduce new
products.
IV.  DATA AND METHOD
A. SOURCE OF THE DATA
The information on laser printer characteristics, entry, and exit come from a variety of
sources.  The primary source is Dataquest’s SpecCheck analysis of page printers.  Dataquest
follows each manufacturer’s products and records a variety of product characteristics, including
ship date, speed, resolution, and other features.  We found the data were incomplete for many
models.  Therefore, we supplemented our data with information from trade journals, private
analysts’ reports, and general industry data provided to us by a private consulting firm.  We
believe the dataset, which covers the industry from its inception in 1984 to 1996, is the most
comprehensive available on the desktop laser printer industry. Over this 13-year period, we are
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able to record 633 printer introductions covering nearly 2835 printer-year observations.  We
restrict the analysis to data from 1986-1996, because too few models were introduced in the early
years of the industry to permit identification of the econometric models.  Though we have
attempted to be as thorough as possible, there remain some printers for which we cannot identify
all of the independent variables.  These have been dropped from the analysis.  All data are
recorded annually.
To identify patterns of innovation we rely on patent data.  We have used the MicroPatent
database to track patent application dates for patents granted in the industry.  We confine our
analysis to three four patent classes:  271, 355, 359, and 395.  Our interviews with industry
experts have suggested that these four patent classes contain most of the patents that would apply
to the laser printer.5 
B. PATTERNS IN THE DATA
We begin by examining patterns in the data to describe the industry.  We consider two
dimensions of the product space: speed, measured as the number of pages per minute (PPM), and
resolution, measured as the number of dots per inch (DPI).  Printers are bunched tightly in
groups in the performance space.  For example, there are many printers that are 4PPM and 600
DPI.  There are a few at 5PPM and 600 DPI, and then there are many at 6PPM and 600 DPI.
Figure 4 presents our categorization of 20 discrete product classes (or niches) in terms of these
two characteristics, based on the clear grouping of printers. In doing this, we are able to measure
the competitive effect of products that are proximate in DPI-PPM space.
                                                
5 Given the size of some of the firms (such as IBM, for example), it is also likely that some firms might have patents
that cover products other than laser printers.  To the extent this is true, it would create noise in the measure, and thus
bias the coefficient to zero. Nevertheless, it would likely still be a good measure of innovativeness in imaging
technology, which would likely be a good measure of the capability in this domain.
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We turn to an analysis of the dynamics of the industry.  Figure 5 offers a scatterplot graph
where each circle is a printer model.  The x-axis is the year, and the y-axis is DPI.  Note that over
time, newer printers have higher resolution.  This is what we will call a single-edged product
innovation frontier, on which firms are pushing the envelope on resolution.  This is akin to the
findings of most studies that examine product improvement (e.g. Christensen 1997, Henderson
1995, Greenstein and Wade 1998).
Figure 6 shows the same type of graph for printer speed (PPM).  In this time series, we
see a different pattern.  During this time period, and especially in 1985-1993, firms introduced
printers that were faster as well as printers that were slower than those introduced in 1984, the
first year the product was developed.  The top frontier of faster printers is as one would expect.
Namely, firms increase the speed of printers through product innovation.  However, the bottom
frontier (or double edged frontier) is not found in other academic studies, but likely exists in
many industries. Why do we see this?
From our investigation of the industry, it seems that this second frontier is driven by the
desire of the manufacturer to reach the mass market.6  To do this, firms must find ways to
produce inexpensive products that are attractive to unsophisticated consumers, yet economical to
produce.  To achieve this outcome firms engage in a number of activities.  First, they eliminate
certain product features found on higher end models.  Second, they change product design and
manufacturing techniques, to be able to produce the printer at lower cost.  It is not just process
innovation that drives the costs of these printers, but product innovation as well—learning how
to design a printer that consumers demand, at a much lower cost.  Thus products on the bottom
frontier, as well as those as on the top frontier, are the most innovative in this respect.  This is
discussed further below.
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C.  VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
We define a product exit as the first year that the product drops out of the dataset.  This
means that none of the sources reports the printer is being shipped to retailers from the
manufacturers, although it may still be available in some retail outlets from inventory.  If any one
of the sources reports the printer is still being shipped, we record it as still on the market.
One alternative measure of product exit is to register an exit when product sales have
ceased.  We have collected the best data available from a private company on the quantity of
models shipped by manufacturers for seven years (1990-1996), and we found they are
incomplete and biased in favor of popular models.7  Our analysis confirms that the data have
poor coverage or do not record units sold for low volume models or for models of smaller
vendors. We know of no source of data that tracks the quantity over the entire time period for
truly all models at the model level.  These data do seem to be realistic at the aggregate sales level
for individual product niches and for large firms, but its precision may still be suspect.  As
extensions to the main regressions, we re-estimate our models using the quantity data in Section
VI.
The right-hand-side variables are grouped into four categories, and are defined in Table
2.  The first category of variable is the product characteristic variables.  These include variables
like MODEL AGE, DPI, and PPM.  The second set of variables measure firm characteristics,
such as DOMINANT FIRM, OWN ALL MODELS, PATENTS, and FIRM AWARD.  A third
set of variables measure the market structure, namely TOTAL MODELS, SAME NICHE, and
                                                                                                                                                            
6 This double-edged frontier could be driven by consumers, some of whom value speed more than others.
7 Greenstein and Wade find similar problems with the IDC data in mainframe computing (1998: p. 779, ftn 13-15).
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SAME DPI/PPM.  A final set of variables measures other factors such as the impact of
complements and substitutes.
The descriptive statistics are found in Table 3.  These statistics provide a rich description
of the data.  The average product stays on the market for four years, and costs almost $2300.
The most prevalent standard is HP-PCL, in 86% of printers, followed by Postscript (a proprietary
Adobe standard) in 55% of printers.  Although the average printer has increased its resolution,
the average speed of the printers has remained constant from the beginning of the industry,
consistent with our earlier discussion on the two-edged frontier of innovation.  In addition, the
average number of products in a given niche is 25.
As a preliminary step in our statistical analysis, we assessed the value of various product
features, so we could see if products with valuable features survive longer in the marketplace.  In
order to measure value, we ran a simple hedonic model.  The results are in Table 4.  In this
model we see that quality adjusted list prices have been dropping at about 10% per year;  today,
quality adjusted prices are about 12% of their 1986 levels.  The regression shows that HP,
instead of commanding a brand name premium, actually receives a 14% list price discount
relative to other firms, but this not statistically significant.8  The hedonic model also calculates
the imputed value of each type of feature.  While each additional PPM increases the value of the
printer by 7%, each 1% increase in LN(DPI) decreases the value by 30%. This is likely an
artifact of the competitive dynamics in the industry, which we discuss later.  HP-PCL standards
adoption tends to decrease the price of the printer by 11% relative to Postscript.  Firm effects are
rarely individually statistically significant, and are not jointly significant.
                                                
8 Kyle and de Figueiredo (2000) find that dominant firms on the whole had lower prices, but they also entered
classes later.  When this late entry is accounted for, it seems dominant latecomers charge higher prices than fringe
firms that enter with a similar delay.  Therefore one explanation for the finding that dominant firms’ products are
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D.  METHOD
We use an exponential hazard rate specification to examine the determinants of product
exit over the product life cycle.  The flexibility of this method in accounting for censoring, as
well as time variant and time invariant independent variables, makes it attractive to study product
failure.
In this specification, the individual model is the unit of analysis. The likelihood function
for any given observation, i, can be written as:
φµ )]()[( ttGL iiii =
where )(tGi is the survivor function, )(tiµ is the hazard rate, φ is a variable that is one for
uncensored cases and zero otherwise, and it  is the number of periods that product i is in the
market (Tuma and Hannan 1984).  We begin by assuming a constant hazard rate of γµ =)(t (the
exponential distribution).  The survivor function is then ]exp[)( ttG γ−= .  The following
specification is used:
where )(tµ is the instantaneous hazard rate for a system at time t and X(t) is a vector of time-
varying independent variables.  Each ])(exp[ αtX can be thought of as multipliers of the hazard
rate, and α  can be estimated using maximum likelihood techniques (Carroll 1983, Tuma and
Hannan 1984).  Because we have data from the beginning of the industry, left censoring is not a
                                                                                                                                                            
less expensive is that fringe products are the most advanced and first to market, while dominant firms follow and
enter at lower prices than existing fringe products.
)]()(exp[)( ttXt αµ =
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problem.  We omit all observations for products that were introduced before 1986 (the first year
of the econometrics).  The estimation procedure accounts for right censoring.9
E.  OPERATIONALIZING THE HYPOTHESES IN THE LASER PRINTER INDUSTRY
If we are to understand the micro-foundations of firm behavior, we must test explicit
predictions of the theory on why products exit.  In particular, is exit due to market conditions
(competition from the products of other firms) or managerial choice (competition from the firm’s
own products)?  Given the four hypotheses stated earlier, we expect to see certain coefficients on
the independent variables.  We describe the effects here and summarize them in Table 5.  The
first hypothesis predicts we will see higher product exit rates the higher competition.  This
suggests that the more product models in the industry, and in the niche, the higher the hazard
rate.  Thus we expect to see positive coefficients on TOTAL MODELS and SAME NICHE.  If
there is competition from neighboring niches, we would expect to see SAME PPM and SAME
DPI also to have positive coefficients.
The second hypothesis predicts that firms with a lower cost position will have lower
probability of product exit.  We therefore expect negative coefficients on the variables that
measure firm size.  Thus DOMINANT FIRM should have a negative coefficient if economies of
scale are being exploited.  We expect CUMULATIVE DOMINANCE to have a negative
coefficient if learning takes place, as some theories suggest is important.  DOMINANT FIRM
measures whether the firm has one of the top ten market shares in the industry in a give year.
                                                
9 Unfortunately, we do not have the sufficiently detailed price and quantity data to estimate consumer demand at this
time. Indeed, our analysis here is not structural. At this early stage in our data collection and analysis we feel it
appropriate to rely on reduced form for analysis.  Patterns in the data have yet to be established statistically, and
structural estimations that are sensitive to specification error and measurement error are likely to pose challenges for
data and interpretation.  However, we do believe that the development of structural models that are tailored to
understanding the demand and cost structures might be a useful path to follow in the future.
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Fixed costs spread out over many units (as opposed to few) will result in lower costs per unit and
higher survival rates.  CUMULATIVE DOMINANCE measures the number of years the firm
has been a top ten producer.  The literature on the learning curve has generally considered
learning to be an increasing function in cumulative output.  Thus increased cumulative output is
expected to increase learning, decrease unit costs, and result in higher survival rates.
The third hypothesis predicts a product portfolio that cannibalizes the firm’s other
products is likely to result in higher product exit rates.  This means products that have many
same-firm products in the same niche are likely to have a higher probability of product exit.
Thus, the coefficients on OWN NICHE MODELS should be positive if the hypothesis is true.
The innovation hypothesis is complex and multipart.  If managers take less innovative
products off the market before they withdraw more innovative products, as in the traditional
model, we should see negative coefficients on PPM and DPI.  However, as noted earlier,
innovative products will be on both frontiers in the PPM space.  Thus the relationship between
survival and PPM in this industry (and industries like it) will be nonlinear and nonmonotonic.
We expect to see greater survival rates on both frontiers.  PPM should have a positive coefficient
and PPM-squared should have a negative coefficient if both frontiers have higher survival
prospects.10
As a second measure of innovative ability of the firm we use PATENTS.  Patents are
frequently used in the literature to measure innovative activity (e.g. Silverman 1998, Hoang et al
1999).  We have no strong priors about the way firms behave.  However, we hope to narrow the
                                                                                                                                                            
10 Note that many discussions of the product “frontier” allude to this top frontier (Christensen 1997).  However,
there are very few papers that consider the bottom frontier.  de Figueiredo and Teece (1996) do consider a dual
frontiered industry, but not in the same way as this paper.
17
possibilities.  If H4a or H4b is true, we should see a positive coefficient on PATENTS; if H4c or
H4d is true, we should see a negative or zero coefficient.
Table 5 summarizes the predictions and tests of the hypotheses we have generated from
the literature.  In addition, we can not only test an integrative theory of product exit examining
product-level data, but we can also compare the magnitude of these four main causes of product
exit using these methods.  While theory does not rule out the possibility that all four effects
might be at work , the relative magnitude of these effects has not been systematically examined
in a single setting.  Our methods allow a comparison.
We also include a number of control variables.  In this industry, there are some printers
that are from an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and then rebranded.  That is, printers
are manufactured by one firm and then just relabeled by another firm.  We have some data on
rebranding in the industry, and include a variable REBRAND to control for these kinds of
printers.  Second, some manufacturers of laser printers are backward integrated into laser engine
manufacturing.  This backward integration may affect their behavior in the downstream printer
market.  We include a dummy variable, ENGINE MANUFACTURER, to control for such firms.
Third, we are concerned about other observed product life cycle effects and outside innovations
and markets.  We include a time trend variable, ink jet printer prices, and personal computer
(PC) sales data by year.  Finally, there may be unobserved quality in the products that drive
decisions about whether to maintain a product in the market or retire it.  We include three
variables that proxy for quality.  The first two, MODEL AWARD and FIRM AWARD, are
designed to control not only for “free marketing”, but also for quality that the researcher today
cannot observe, but experts in the field could assess at the time.  The last variable, HEDONIC
RESIDUAL, is the residual from the hedonic price equation, and is the difference between the
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product’s predicted and actual prices.  .  A high price, for example, could indicate a high cost
structure, or unobserved quality that merits a price premium (Stavins 1995).
V.  RESULTS
We present six models in Table 6.  The first number next to each variable name is the
hazard ratio (or multiplier of the hazard rate).  A value of less than one indicates that an increase
in the variable lowers the hazard rate; a value of more than one indicates that an increase in the
variable raises the hazard rate.  (In the remainder of the paper, we will sometimes refer the
multipliers less than one as “negative coefficients”, and multipliers greater than one as “positive
coefficients.”)  The asymptotic t-statistics are presented in parentheses below the coefficient
estimate.  The significance is shown for two-tailed t-tests at the 95% and 90% significance
levels.
Model 1 presents the data with the variables related to age (MODEL AGE, TIME
TREND), product characteristics (POSTSCRIPT, HP-PCL, MODEL AWARD, DPI, PPM,
PPM-squared, PRICE), and firm characteristics (FIRM AWARD, OWN ALL MODELS, OWN
NICHE MODELS).  Model 2 adds the market structure variables.  In Model 3, we include the
additional innovation variables.  Model 4 adds REPLACEMENT, a variable is equal to 1 if the
firm entered a product into the same product niche at the same time it exited a product and 0
otherwise.  Given that the entry decision is probably endogenous to the exit decision, we include
this specification cautiously, mainly as a discussion point, rather than to provide any structural
interpretation of the relationship between entry and exit.  Unfortunately, hazard rate models that
allow for an endogenous binary variable on the right hand side have not yet been fully
developed.
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Across the four models, the coefficient estimates are remarkably stable in both their
magnitude and statistical significance.  A log likelihood ratio test indicates Models 3 and 4 have
equivalent explanatory power at the 95% level as Model 2.  Model 2 outperforms Model 1.  We
also see from this analysis the coefficient on many variables, that are statistically significant in
Model 1, such as DOMINANT IN YEAR, HP, and OWN NICHE MODELS, change sign or lose
their significance once we control for the market competition and innovation explanations for
product exit in Models 2-4.
We can now turn to understanding the performance of the four theories in explaining
product exit.  The first hypothesis predicts competition drives products out of markets.  We do
find very strong evidence for this hypothesis.  The multipliers on both TOTAL and SAME
NICHE are greater than 1 and statistically significant.  These results suggest that each additional
competing product on the market results in a 2% greater probability of exit, and each additional
product in the same niche increases the probability of exit by another 2%. Given that on average
there are 25 product models in a given niche, the effect of this variable could be large in crowded
niches.  This is consistent with H1, and its magnitude is relatively large, given the large number
of products on the market.  Neighboring product niches (SAME PPM, SAME DPI) do not
increase the probability of exit, and actually decrease the probability of focal product exit by
0.7% to 0.9%.  This interesting result might be because neighboring niches don’t compete with
focal niches, but advertising externalities accrue to products in the same speed and resolution
niches.  Alternatively, the effect of neighboring competition may not be separately identified
from total and same niche measures.
The second hypothesis examines whether firms with lower cost position are more likely
to have their products survive longer on the market.  We bifurcated this test into two parts:
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economies of scale and learning.  In no model is the coefficient on DOMINANT FIRM
statistically significant, suggesting dominant firms do not have an advantage in product survival
rates per se.  We are unable to validate hypothesis H2a: if economies of scale are present, they
are not reflected in lower hazard rates.  This result is stable even including REBRAND, a
variable that controls for products that are merely “re-badged.”  However, firms that have been
dominant for a number of years do have longer-lived products, consistent with the learning
hypothesis (H2b).   For every additional year that a firm has been a dominant firm, they enjoy a
6% lower hazard rate for their products.  We further refine this result in next section, and
illustrate its lack of robustness with better measures.
The third hypothesis centers on cannibalization.  It predicts that products with many
competitors in the same niche manufactured by the same firm have higher probability of exit.
The hazard ratio of OWN NICHE MODELS is greater than one, implying an increase in the
probability that a given product exits by 2-4%, but is not statistically significant in any
specification.  .
The final hypothesis concerns innovation.  Do more innovative products last on the
market longer, or do the forces of creative destruction drive high turnover?  As we expect in high
technology industries, older products have higher hazard rates.  Examining the PPM, PPM2, and
DPI variable coefficients, we see that products on frontiers, whether the top frontier or lower
frontier, have better survival prospects than products behind the frontier.   DPI and PPM-squared
have negative coefficients, as predicted, and PPM has a positive coefficient; all the coefficients
are statistically significant in Models 2-4. 11  This is consistent with increased survival for
innovative products (H4e), and the results are quite strong.  In addition, we have four hypotheses
                                                
11 We have also used dummy variables for each PPM Class, and the rank order of the coefficients support the
specifications being suggested here.
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related to the product exit and entry patterns of innovative firms.  The coefficient on PATENTS
is small and not statistically significant in any specification.12  This allows us to reject H4a and
H4b, which predict shorter lives for innovative products due to “racing” behavior.  That is, in
this industry, the “innovator” tends to keep its current product portfolio on the market.
Innovative firms do not exit products from markets at higher rates than their less innovative
counterparts.  In the next section, we examine whether H4c or H4d are more likely outcomes.
In Model 4, we examine REPLACEMENT, subject to earlier caveats.  We would like to
know if a company pulls a product at the same time it enters a new one.  The coefficient on
REPLACEMENT is less than one, but not statistically significant, suggesting exit is not more
likely when a firm introduces an additional product into the same niche.  However, this result,
because of the potential endogeneity of the variable, must be viewed cautiously.  We discuss this
much further in the next section.
Finally, we turn to the control variables.  Vertically integrated firms that manufacture
both laser printer engines and laser printers have a 31% lower hazard rate for their laser printers.
Future research should examine this finding.  HP seems to enjoy no statistically significant
higher or lower survival rates for its products than do other manufacturers, controlling for other
factors.  Although higher priced products do not have higher hazard rates, controlling for product
and firm observable characteristics, products that incorporate HP-PCL standards (the main
standard in the industry) survive longer on the market.   The coefficient on the residual from the
hedonic pricing equation is not statistically significant, suggesting the unobservable qualities that
generate a “high price” are probably due to higher quality, rather than higher cost (in contrast to
                                                
12 We have chosen these patent classes because it is our understanding from interviews that most recorded laser
printer innovations occur in these patent classes.  The coefficient could be insignificant because a) there are software
innovations that are not patented, b) laser printer innovations occur in other patent classes that we have missed, c)
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Stavins 1995).  PC sales have no effect on printer hazard rates.  However, increases in inkjet
prices are related to much higher exit rates for laser printers.  Every $100 increase in the price of
inkjet printers results in an 80-88% higher probability that the laser printer will exit the market.
While this is the opposite effect one might expect of a substitute product, the price of inkjet
printers reflects the advances in that technology that allow ink-jets to compete with low-end laser
printers.  Our results suggest that substitute products (inkjet printers) play a larger role in this
industry than complements (PCs).
Overall we find that competition drives less innovative products out of markets.  On the
cost side, learning seems to have a larger impact than economies of scale, as measured in this
study, in determining product exit.  However, innovation is potentially quite important.  We
explore innovation and learning further in the next section.
VI.  REFINEMENTS
In this section, we introduce four refinements to the empirical work that explore the
importance of innovation, cannibalization, cost, and competition in determining product survival
rates.  The first refinement examines demand.  It is reasonable to expect that in product niches
where there is strong (and perhaps growing) demand, products that have high cost, high price, or
poor quality may survive longer than similar products that are in niches with low demand or
slowing growth.  To examine this possibility, we include in the hazard rate model a variable
called NICHE DEMAND, which is the number of units sold in the product niche in that year.
Earlier in the paper, we noted the questionable quality of this measure, but we include it in
Models 5 and 6 of Table 6 in the hope that even a crude indicator might be useful.  This variable
                                                                                                                                                            
firms do not patent laser printer innovations, d) other technologies, on top of laser printer innovations, appear in
these patent classes, or e) patents are a poor measure of innovation in this industry.
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is comprehensively available beginning only in 1990.  Thus, we are required to drop printers
from the dataset that were introduced before 1990.  Models 5 and 6 illustrate that the coefficient
on NICHE DEMAND is negative, as expected, but statistically significant only at the 83% level,
so we are unable to conclude that higher demand increases survival.  Better demand data over a
longer time series might help us sort out the results.
A second extension is a further examination of the economies of scale and learning
hypotheses.  In Models 1-4, we use an ordinal measure of market share, and classify a firm as
DOMINANT IN YEAR if it is in the top ten of market share in a given year to measure the
effects of economies of scale.  We then measure cumulative learning through YEARS OF
DOMINANCE, which measures the number of years a firm has been a dominant firm.   We
show that while the former variable has no statistical impact on product exit rates, the latter does.
In this section, we shorten the sample from 1990 to 1996 and incorporate firm quantity data in
thousands of units.  Thus, UNITS is the number of units shipped by a firm in a given year, and
CUMULATIVE UNITS is the cumulative units shipped by a firm over time to the present year,
inclusive.13  We show in Models 5 and 6 that both result in lower hazard rates as before, but are
not statistically significant.  Thus, the earlier result supporting the notion of learning in this
industry lacks robustness under this better, albeit shorter time-series, measure.
A third extension is an examination of dominant and fringe product survival rates.  We
show that in some cases dominant firm products have longer survival prospects than fringe firm
products.  However, it would be interesting to know if this result is a consequence of the fact that
dominant firms have longer lives, a type of sample selection.  That is, is fringe firm product exit
partially due to fringe firm exit?  In Figure 7, we create a frequency distribution for fringe
                                                
13 There may be problems with this measure because we do not pick up the learning that occurred from 1986-1989.
However, given the slow market growth during this time, the quantities should not be too large.
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product survival and fringe firm survival, and dominant product survival and dominant firm
survival.  While the fringe firm survival is almost uniformly distributed across the years,
dominant firm survival is severely skewed toward longevity.  Thus, it is reasonable to think that
firm exit is related to product exit.  The relationship between firm and product exit would be an
interesting question for future study.
A final extension is a refinement of the innovation hypothesis.  In Figure 1, we argued
that there were four potential outcomes for innovation.  In the hazard rate model, we show that
patents have little effect on product exit.  This result supports Hypothesis 4c and 4d.  However,
we would like to distinguish between the two.
To this end, we conduct an analysis of entry.  In this analysis, a model or product entry
occurs when it first appears in our database.  This is normally the first ship date reported by
analysts.  We count the number of product introductions for each firm for each niche for each
year, so each observation is a firm-niche-year observation.  Once a firm has entered the market, a
firm becomes at risk for entry into any niche, and it remains at risk for all time periods that it has
a printer still on the market.14  The dependent variable is the count of products entered by the
firm in a given niche-year.
Many of the independent variables to describe market structure are the same as in the
previous section, such as the degree of competition in the focal niche and the total number of
printers in the same DPI niche and PPM niche.  We also use many of the same firm variables,
such as awards to the firm and dominant firm status.  We include three additional variables.
WAGE is the average wage of a Level 4 engineer as defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
An entry decision may be affected by the product development cost.  One such cost is the labor
                                                
14 We have coded the data in this way because we believe that the decision to enter the market at all is fundamentally
different than a decision to continue in the marketplace.
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of engineers, who are required to design new products, but are less important when the printer is
actually in manufacturing.  LAG OF ENTRY is the lag of the count of products of a firm’s entry
in the niche.  DOMINANT POSITION measures whether the firm was in the top ten of market
share for two consecutive years.
To estimate these equations, we begin with the assumption that the count variables are
Poisson distributed.  Unfortunately, specification tests (Cameron and Trivedi 1986) indicate
there is overdispersion in the data. Overdispersion occurs when the Poisson model assumption
that the conditional mean of the event counts equals the variance is violated.  We therefore use
estimate the model assuming a negative binomial distribution, which allows for overdispersion.15
It sets the condition mean at ]exp[)|( βiiii xuxyE == , but allows the variance to take the form
iii uxyV )1()|( α+= . 
16 Each of the parameters of ])(exp[ βix can be thought of as multipliers of
the rate of product introduction.
Table 7 displays the entry regressions.  Models 7 and 8 present the entry model without
the innovation variable, without and with year fixed effects and firm fixed effects.  Models 9 and
10 present the entry model with the innovation variable, without and with year fixed effects and
firm fixed effects.  The incidence ratio or multiplier is presented with its asymptotic t-statistic
beneath in parentheses.  If the multiplier is more than one, an increase in the variable by one unit
is associated with an increase in the number of product introductions; numbers less than one
mean fewer product introductions.  All coefficients are marked for statistical significance on two
tailed asymptotic t-tests.17   All coefficients, except wages, are signed as expected and
                                                
15 We have estimated the models using a linear tobit formulation and results are roughly the same.
16 In all of the negative binomial regressions, the estimated value of α is statistically significant.
17 In specifications not reported here, we included variables for complements (PC sales) and substitutes (ink jet
prices), but were unable to disentangle these effects from the wage effects.
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statistically significant at the 95% level of confidence in Models 7 and 9, and most coefficients
are statistically significant at the 95% level in Models 8 and 10.
Dominant firms are likely to introduce new products at over three times the rate of fringe
firms.  Competition (SAME NICHE) results in less entry, as expected.  Every additional product
in the niche results in 2-3% lower entry rate.  Thus competition not only speeds exit, but slows
entry, consistent with broader economic theories of product markets.
The innovation variable, PATENTS, which is the focus on the innovation hypothesis, has
a positive and statistically significant coefficient in Models 9 and 10.  This suggests that firms
that are more innovative have higher entry rates.  Each 10 new patents in the key patent classes
increases the rate of entry by about 1-2%.  The product entry rates would be approximately 9%-
18% greater for the average innovator with 92 patents than for the non-innovator.  This result,
along with the results of the hazard rate regressions, is consistent with hypothesis H4d: enter, no
exit.  That is, innovative firms are not exiting their products more quickly than other firms, but
they are entering at higher rates.  This result is consistent with an extensive literature on product
proliferation in differentiated product space to block entry FIX (e.g. Schmalensee 1978, Scherer
198218) and with the marketing literature on brand extension.  Innovators choose to cannibalize
their existing portfolio by expanding and improving their product line.
VII. DISCUSSION
Why do products exit markets?  Do managers choose to pull products after they introduce
more innovative replacements, or are the incumbent products driven out?  This paper suggests
that managers of innovative companies are careful and strategic.  Innovative companies have no
greater propensity to pull their older products off the market than do non-innovative companies.
Rather, they seem to innovate and enter, and leave their incumbent products on the market to be
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forced out by the competition. This strategy may derive its profits through blocking entry,
obtaining market power in the channel, or a host of other reasons not explored here.  Competition
is quite an important force in determining product exit rates.  While learning may advantage
some firms, the results are not extremely robust, and substantively have a small impact on
product survival.  Together, these results suggest managers have developed innovation strategies
to take advantage of their competitive environment.
This paper also has some initial findings unrelated to product exit.  First, we show that
there can be two innovation frontiers for a product, a top frontier which is the traditional “make it
better, faster” product innovation frontier, and a bottom frontier which is the “make it cheaper,
accessible” frontier.  We demonstrate that products on either frontier have better survival
prospects.  These kind of dual frontiers probably exist in a number of industries, such as personal
computers (with the Celeron), DVD players, and digital TVs, to name just a few.  It would be
interesting to document the frontiers in other industries, and examine in more detail what
happens on the bottom frontier.  Second, we have shown the importance of fringe firms in the
marketplace.  Nearly 50% of product introductions in the desktop laser printer industry are by
fringe firms.  They represent 80% of all firms in the industry.  Future studies should attempt to
examine these firms in greater detail, as they can have a big impact on the results of strategic
interaction and competition.  Third, we have illustrated the relationship between firm survival
and product survival rates (see Figure 7).  Investigating the micro-foundations of survival at the
product level would deepen the understanding of firm survival provided by numerous earlier
studies.
                                                                                                                                                            
18 Judd (1985) proposes a model in which a product proliferation strategy is credible only if there are exit costs.
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Figure 1:  Hypotheses 4a-d
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Figure 2: Number of Firms and Products in Marketplace
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Figure 3: Product Entry and Exit
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Figure 5:  DPI by Model
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Figure 7:  Printer and Firm Survival Rates
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TABLE 1A:  CONCENTRATION RATIOS TABLE 1B:  NUMBER OF YEARS IN 
AND TOTAL SHIPMENTS TOP TEN IN SHIPMENTS
Year Hewlett Packard C5 Ratio C10 Ratio
Total 
Estimated 
Shipments Firm Years
1987 58.12% 87.83% 100.00% 411,845 HEWLETT-PACKARD_COMPANY 9
1988 61.66% 87.31% 99.28% 646,097 IBM/LEXMARK 9
1989 49.68% 87.48% 98.47% 991,331 DIGITAL_EQUIPMENT_CORP 8
1990 54.89% 78.39% 87.44% 1,925,152 PANASONIC/MATSUSHITA 8
1991 48.80% 76.59% 90.13% 2,687,110 APPLE_COMPUTER_CO 7
1992 50.58% 80.17% 92.89% 2,303,355 OKIDATA_CORP 7
1993 57.08% 82.36% 92.92% 2,303,990 TEXAS_INSTRUMENTS_INC 7
1994 55.88% 80.49% 94.42% 2,795,232 EPSON_AMERICA_INC 6
1995 60.53% 85.95% 99.62% 2,814,688 NEC_TECHNOLOGIES_INC 6
KYOCERA_UNISON 5
CANON 4
QMS_INC 4
XEROX_CORP 3
BROTHER_INTERNATIONAL_CORP 2
C-TECH_ELECTRONICS_INC 1
FUJITSU_AMERICA_INC 1
GCC_TECHNOLOGIES_INC 1
SUN_MICROSYSTEMS 1
TANDY_CORP 1
YEAR Time trend variable to the beginning of the industry.
MODEL AGE The age of the product measured as the number of years since introduction.
HP-PCL, POSTSCRIPT, 
DIABLO, and EPSON
Dummy variables for printing standards.
MODEL AWARD and 
FIRM AWARD
One measure of product quality is to examine whether the printer has won an award for price 
and performance.  Every year, PC Magazine announces 4-10 printer awards for printers that 
they judge to be particularly good value across the spectrum of printers available, based on 
features and predicted reliability.    MODEL AWARD equals one if the particular model won an 
award.  FIRM AWARD equals one for all models manufactured by a firm if any of its models 
won an award in the prior two years.
REBRAND Dummy variable equalling one if the product is made by another firm and then just rebranded.
DPI The resolution of the printer measured in dots per inch, measured as log(100dpi).
PPM The speed of the printer measured in pages per minute.
PPM-squared Speed of printer, measured in pages per minute, squared.
PRICE List price of the printer.
HEDONIC RESIDUAL The value of the residual from the hedonic regression.
DOMINANT FIRM A dummy variable equaling one if the vendor was one of the top ten producers in terms of 
market share for the given year, zero otherwise.
CUMULATIVE 
DOMINANCE
A count variable equaling the number of years the producers is in the top ten producers, up to 
the given year.
UNITS Number of units shipped in the given year by the firm.
CUMULATIVE UNITS Total number of units shipped by the firm during the previous and given year.
HP Dummy variable for HP.
OWN ALL MODELS The number of total models the focal vendor currently has in the desktop printer market.
OWN NICHE MODELS The number of models the focal vendor currently has in the focal class.
ENGINE MANF Dummy variable for engine manufacturer.
TOTAL MODELS The number of total models in the desktop laser printer market at the time.
SAME DPI and SAME 
PPM:
The number of products that are at the same DPI (all classes covering the same DPI), and the 
number of products that are at the same PPM (all classes covering the same PPM).
SAME NICHE The number of products competing in the same local PPM-DPI class as the product under 
consideration.  
INK JET PRICE The average price of ink jet printers.   
PC SALES The number of personal computers sold in the United States in millions.
PATENTS The number of new patents issued, by application year, in patent classes 271, 355, 359, and 395.
REPLACEMENT Dummy variable = 1 if the firm entered a new printer model in the class in the given year.
NICHE DEMAND Number of units shipped in a given niche in a given year.
ENGINEERING WAGE The average wage of a Level 4 engineer as defined by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
DOMINANT POSITION Dummy variable = 1 if the firm was in the top ten of marketshare for two years
LAG OF ENTRY The lag of the count of products of a firm’s entry in the class
TABLE 2:  VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
VARIABLE MEAN STD. DEV.
TIME TREND 8.432 2.173
AGE 3.036 1.857
POSTSCRIPT 0.545 0.499
HP-PCL 0.864 0.343
MODEL AWARD 0.102 0.303
REBRAND 0.093 0.291
LN DPI 6.097 0.459
PPM 7.946 2.573
PRICE 22.508 17.568
HEDONIC RESIDUAL 0.000 0.335
REPLACEMENT 0.392 0.488
SAME PPM 71.605 35.584
SAME DPI 176.463 101.647
SAME NICHE 25.359 16.014
DOMINANT IN YEAR 0.169 0.378
YEARS OF DOMINANCE 1.559 2.944
HP 0.017 0.130
OWN IN NICHE 1.864 1.514
OWN MODELS 11.610 12.605
FIRM AWARD 0.153 0.363
ENGINE MFR 0.220 0.418
PATENTS 52.203 138.867
TABLE 3:  DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
PPM 0.076
(6.85)
DPI -0.308
(-3.51)
LN STD MEMORY 0.418
(13.29)
HP-PCL -0.114
(-1.19)
DIABLO 0.059
(0.66)
EPSON 0.020
(0.23)
OTHER STANDARD 0.431
(2.94)
HP -0.148
(-0.35)
1987 -1.011
(-2.33)
1988 -0.473
(-1.04)
1989 -1.111
(-2.69)
1990 -1.178
(-2.90)
1991 -1.322
(-3.27)
1992 -1.573
(-3.86)
1993 -1.750
(-4.33)
1994 -1.824
(-4.46)
1995 -1.868
(-4.52)
1996 -1.969
(-4.71)
1997 -2.116
(-3.41)
Firm Fixed Effects Not sig
N 354
R-Squared 0.7443
Note:  Dependent Variable is Ln(ListPrice).  
T-statistics beneath estimated coefficients.
Bolded coefficients are significant at 95% level.
Postscript is the omitted standard.
TABLE 4:  HEDONIC PRICING OF LASER PRINTER
Hypothesis Variable
Expected 
Sign
Actual 
Sign
Substantive 
Impact
H1:  Competition TOTAL MODELS + + Large
SAME NICHE + + Large
H2a:  Fixed Cost DOMINANT FIRM - 0
H2b:  Learning CUMULATIVE DOMINANCE - - Small
H3:  Cannibalization OWN NICHE + 0
H4:  INNOVATION
H4a:  Hold, Exit PATENTS + 0
H4b:  Enter, Exit PATENTS + 0
H4c:  Hold, No Exit PATENTS 0 0
PATENTS IN ENTRY 0 +
H4d:  Enter, No Exit PATENTS 0 0 Moderate
PATENTS IN ENTRY + + Large
H4e:  Innovative Products PPM + + Large
PPM-SQUARED - - Moderate
DPI - - Large
Note:  Bolded hypotheses are broadly confirmed by the data.  
Actual sign is based on sign and significance level for Models 1-6.
Substantive impact is subjective based on magnitude of coefficients.
Results 
TABLE 5:  OPERATIONALIZATION AND OUTCOMES OF TESTS OF HYPOTHESES
TABLE 6:  HAZARD RATE MODELS FOR PRODUCT EXIT
VARIABLE MODEL 1 MODEL 2 MODEL 3 MODEL 4 MODEL 5 MODEL 6
TIME TREND 1.853
(7.20)
0.581
(-1.42)
0.565
(-1.69)
0.563
(-1.70)
0.232
(-2.55)
0.232
(-2.55)
MODEL AGE 1.233
(6.15)
1.163
(5.42)
1.163
(5.39)
1.153
(5.00)
1.246
(5.27)
1.249
(5.01)
POSTSCRIPT 0.979
(-0.14)
0.916
(-0.72)
0.925
(-0.63)
0.928
(-0.61)
1.061
(0.41)
1.062
(0.42)
HP-PCL 0.688
(-1.87)
0.747
(-1.74)
0.753
(-1.70)
0.751
(-1.73)
0.605
(-2.69)
0.604
(-2.67)
MODEL AWARD 0.927
(-0.37)
0.870
(-0.90)
0.889
(-0.76)
0.881
(-0.81)
0.755
(-1.51)
0.756
(-1.52)
REBRAND 0.938
(-0.30)
0.866
(-0.90)
0.86
(-0.94)
0.866
(-0.90)
0.808
(-1.10)
0.801
(-1.06)
LN DPI 0.698
(-1.84)
0.417
(-2.72)
0.412
(-2.77)
0.411
(-2.77)
0.485
(-1.77)
0.489
(-1.73)
PPM 1.257
(1.43)
1.539
(2.52)
1.529
(2.47)
1.498
(2.33)
1.610
(2.03)
1.626
(2.01)
PPM2 0.988
(-1.17)
0.976
(-2.16)
0.976
(-2.12)
0.978
(-1.97)
0.973
(-1.81)
0.972
(-1.78)
PRICE 0.996
(-0.44)
1.008
(1.21)
1.008
(1.25)
1.008
(1.33)
1.007
(0.93)
1.007
(0.91)
HEDONIC RESIDUAL 1.531
(2.06)
1.245
(1.26)
1.240
(1.23)
1.234
(1.22)
1.186
(0.95)
1.188
(0.96)
DOMINANT IN YEAR 0.889
(-0.60)
0.901
(-0.61)
0.892
(-0.65)
0.868
(-0.80)
YEARS OF DOMINANCE 0.877
(-4.39)
0.941
(-2.20)
0.938
(-2.28)
0.940
(-2.21)
UNITS 0.927
(-1.16)
0.929
(-1.12)
CUMULATIVE UNITS 0.994
(-0.08)
0.993
(-0.10)
HP 0.528
(-1.67)
0.688
(-1.30)
0.685
(-1.31)
0.721
(-1.12)
0.836
(-0.60)
0.828
(-0.62)
OWN NICHE MODELS 1.057
(1.60)
1.027
(0.84)
1.027
(0.84)
1.037
(1.13)
1.020
(0.52)
1.017
(0.46)
OWN ALL MODELS 1.021
(3.83)
1.005
(1.03)
1.005
(0.99)
1.004
(0.91)
1.002
(0.36)
1.002
(0.36)
FIRM AWARD 1.549
(2.53)
1.237
(1.15)
1.229
(1.10)
1.242
(1.16)
1.141
(0.73)
1.138
(0.72)
ENGINE MANF 0.530
(-3.51)
0.709
(-2.62)
0.688
(-2.88)
0.699
(-2.74)
0.718
(-2.50)
0.718
(-2.5)
PC SALES 0.925
(-4.97)
1.078
(0.79)
1.083
(0.94)
1.080
(0.91)
1.149
(1.50)
1.150
(1.55)
INKJET PRICES 1.329
(3.10)
1.818
(3.23)
1.873
(3.57)
1.873
(3.57)
9.031
(2.75)
9.080
(2.77)
TOTAL MODELS 1.02
(3.96)
1.021
(4.49)
1.021
(4.49)
1.033
(4.04)
1.033
(4.06)
SAME PPM 0.992
(-2.87)
0.992
(-2.79)
0.992
(-2.73)
0.991
(-2.27)
0.991
(-2.29)
SAME DPI 0.993
(-2.63)
0.993
(-2.58)
0.993
(-2.56)
0.992
(-2.33)
0.992
(-2.33)
SAME NICHE 1.021
(2.41)
1.021
(2.36)
1.020
(2.30)
1.031
(2.42)
1.031
(2.45)
PATENTS 1.00
(1.18)
1.00
(1.22)
1.00
(0.78)
1.00
(0.76)
REPLACEMENT 0.846
(-1.07)
1.039
(0.19)
NICHE DEMAND 1.00
(-1.37)
1.00
(-1.37)
N 1603 1603 1603 1603 1239 1239
Log Likelihood -203.789 -105.478 -105.08 -104.751 -81.707 -81.696
Note:  All coefficients are hazard ratios.  T-statistics are in parentheses below the hazard ratio.
Bolded coefficients are significant at the 95% level; bolded and italicized coefficients are significant at the 90% level.
TABLE 7:  NEGATIVE BINOMIAL FOR ENTRY
VARIABLE MODEL 7 MODEL 8 MODEL 9 MODEL 10
TIME TREND 0.856
(-4.12)
0.856
(-2.36)
0.847
(-4.37)
0.830
(-2.78)
FIRM AWARD 1.928
(3.56)
1.33
(1.21)
1.946
(3.6)
1.263
(0.99)
HP 0.774
(-0.62)
1.749
(0.68)
0.729
(-0.76)
1.646
(0.29)
ENGINE MFR 1.249
(1.47)
2.016
(0.43)
1.103
(0.61)
2.237
(0.5)
DOMINANT POSITION 3.358
(7.97)
3.800
(1.02)
3.121
(7.3)
3.136
(0.86)
LAG OF ENTRY 1.372
(12.97)
1.448
(12.55)
1.365
(12.68)
1.446
(12.41)
WAGE 1.375
(2.29)
1.380
(1.59)
1.411
(2.47)
1.445
(1.8)
SAME DPI 1.004
(3.75)
1.005
(4.46)
1.004
(3.84)
1.005
(4.41)
SAME PPM 1.011
(4.51)
1.012
(4.22)
1.012
(4.63)
1.012
(4.26)
SAME NICHE 0.982
(-2.20)
0.977
(-2.67)
0.983
(-2.15)
0.977
(-2.62)
PATENTS 1.001
(2.46)
1.002
(2.94)
YEAR FIXED EFFECTS jointly sig jointly sig
FIRM FIXED EFFECTS jointly sig jointly sig
N 15757 15757 15757 15757
Log Likelihood -1506.55 -1368.12 -1503.54 -1363.30
Note:  The dependent variable is count of model entry in each class by each firm.
Bolded coefficients are significant at the 95% level; bolded and italicized are significant at the 90% level.
All coefficients are presented as incidence ratios; the t-statistics are below the coefficients in parentheses.
